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RALPH L. CONK, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. Case Number 16227 
WALLACE L. CHAMBERS, M.D., 
and GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC, 
a corporation, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 'TWO ISSUE RULE' URGED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOULD 
NOT BE ADOPTED BY THIS COURT AND IF ADOPTED, 
SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
Respondent's first assertion in his brief is that if any 
error is found in the trial court's conduct of the trial it 
is harmless error because other issues were error free. This 
theory has been referred to as the "two issue rule." It is 
urged that this court should adopt that rule. (Respondent's 
Brief pp. 11-20). 
Appellant takes the position that the "two issue rule" 
is not the rule in Utah, has never been the rule in Utah, 
does not fit the structure of Utah law, is not a just rule, 
and should not be adopted by the Court. Nonetheless, even 
under the premises of the "two issue rule" the errors claimed 
by Rppellant constitute prejudicial error. 
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.. 
As a first step toward the analysis of the two issue 
rule in the case at bar appellant asserts that the allegations 
error in his brief are in fact error as briefed earlier. Cert 
of those allegations will be discussed again later in rep~~ 
respondent's arguments in this reply brief. 
Of major importance, however, in addition to the authoriti 
cited in appellant's brief is the undeniable error corrunitted i:. 
Instruction Numbers 24 and 25 (R. 163 & 164), and the Court's 
failure to direct a verdict in appellant's favor on the 
issue of the statute of limitations, and failure to grant appE: 
lant' s motion for a new trial. Subsequent to the filing of 
appellant's brief the Supreme Court of Utah announced its 
decision in the case of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 
(1979). Therein the Court was confronted with one of the 
identical issues presented in Point I(A-D) pages 5-29 in 
Appellant's Brief concerning whether the statute of limitation' 
(§79-14-4 U.C.A., 1953) commences to run from the date of 
injury or from the date an injured person knows or should 
know that a known injury was caused by what is alleged to be 
a negligent act. Citing most of the same authorities as those 
cited in appellant's brief the Court held, " that t~ 
statute begins to run when an injured person knows or should 
know that he has suffered a legal injury," and further, ... 
the two year provision does not commence to run until 
the injured person knew or should have known that he had 
sustained an injury and the injury was caused by negligent 
action." The instructions were erroneous and the evide~e 
as cited previously can only lead to the conclusion that it 
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was indeed error of major proportion to submit the issue to 
the jury at all. 
The error(s) at the trial court level having been established 
we next confront the "two issue rule." One thing is patently 
clear from all of the cases in favor of and opposed to the 
"two issue rule"; it is no more and no less than a method to 
determine when an error is prejudicial. In Utah that determination 
is governed by Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court incon-
s istant with substantial justice. . . . 
(emphasis added) 
Therefore, in determining whether an error is "inconsistent 
with substantial justice," we must look to the court's decisions. 
In Joseph v. L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957), 
the Court reversed the trial court to allow plaintiff to read and 
argue to the jury notations by defendant on hospital records that 
were already placed in evidence. Defendant urged that if it 
was error, it was harmless error. The court found the error 
to be prejudicial over defendant's protestations: 
Neither this statutory [Rule 61, supra.] 
mandate, nor the policy we follow thereunder, 
goes so far as to require that we ignore errors 
that may have a substantial effect upon the out-
come of the trial. 
It is not always easy to tell when an error 
should be regarded as prejudicial • . • · ~t is 
necessary to survey all of the facts.and.circum-
stances disclosed by the record and if, in so 
doing, the error appears to be of such a.nature 
that it can be said with assurance that it was 
of no material consequence in its effect upon 
the trial because reasonable minds would have 
-3-
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arrived at the same result, regardless of such 
error, it would be harmless and the granting of 
a new trial would not be warranted. On the other 
hand, it it appears to be of sufficient moment 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
the absence of such error a different result 
would have eventuated, the error should be 
regarded as prejudicial and relief should be 
granted. Measured by such considerations we assay 
the possible effect of the error complained of, 
realizing of course that it is now quite impos-
sible to tell definitely whether the verdict 
would have been different. (318 P.2d at 333) 
(emphasis added) 
See also, Startin v. Madsen, 120 U. 631, 237 P. 2d 834 (1951); 
Boyd v. San Pedro, L.A.&S.L.R. Co., 45 U.449, 146 P.2d 282 
(1915); Hillyard v. Utah By-Products, 1 U2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 
(1953). 
The alleged errors before this court taken singly and/or 
collectively show a "reasonable likelihood that in the absence 
of such error(s) a different result would have eventuated.' 
The Joseph, supra, case is law in Utah on what constitute: 
harmless or harmful error. Respondent would take the just 
discretion from the hands of the court by means of an artifici: 
rule that has at best received mixed reviews and that would no: 
allow the court to review each case by looking into the entire: 
of the law and evidence in determining whether a given error 
is "inconsistent with substantial justice." Rule 61, ~· 
The Supreme Court of the United States has taken the 
position in a Federal Antitrust action under the Clayton Act 
(15 USC Section 17) which is governed by Rule 61 of the Federa: 
. tternec Rules of Civil Procedure after which Utah Rule 61 is pa 
f in pertinent part that a general verdict cannot be upheld 1 
-4-
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error was committed upon any one issue either in the admission 
of evidence of in the charge of the court. The Court stated 
its position as follows: 
Since we hold erroneous one theory of liability 
upon which the general verdict may have rested--
a conspiracy among petitioner and Exchange Lemon--
it is unnecessary for us to explore the legality 
of the other theories. As was stated of a general 
verdict in Maryland use of Markley v. Baldwin, 112 
U.S. 490, 493, 28 L.ed. 822, 823, 5 Sup.Ct. 278 
(1884), "[I)ts generality prevents us from 
perceiving upon which plea they found. If, there-
fore, upon any one issue error was committed, 
either in the admission of evidence, or in the charge 
of the court, the verdict cannot be upheld ... " 
Sunkist Growers, Inc., et al. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus 
Products Co. et al., 370 U.S. 19, 8 L.ed.2d 305, 82 Sup.Ct. 
1130, reh den 370 U.S. 965, 8 L.ed.2d 834, 82 Sup.Ct. 1577 (1962). 
The position of the Supreme Court in the Sunkist, supra, case 
has been followed in a large number of jurisdictions. Such 
jurisdictions uniformly base their decisions on the proposition 
that where error is committed and where justice requires 
reversal of a case in order to insure a a litigant a fair trial, 
prejudice will be presumed. They acknowledge that there is 
a split in opinion among various jurisdictions on the "two 
issue rule", but have determined that their policy is the 
better reasoned, more just and in the majority. See, e.g., 
Bredouw v. Jones, 431 P.2d 413 (Okla. 1967) and the cases 
cited therein; Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust co., 417 P.2d 816 
(Haw. 1966) and the cases cited therein; Maccia v. Tynes, 
120 A.2d 263 (N.J. 1956) and the cases cited therein. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
q 
Similarily, this Court long ago in an analagous situati~ 
involving inconsistent instructions to a jury held that it is 
reversible error to so instruct a jury because the court cannot 
tell whether the jury followed the correct or incorrect 
instruction. Konold v. D.&R.G.W. Ry. Co., 21 Utah 379, 60 
P. 1201 (1900). 
Likewise, in the case at bar, it is impossible for the Co:: 
to determine whether the jury made its decision based upon enc 
in a given instruction or on an error free instruction. T~ 
law in Konold, supra, has not changed since that time and shoul: 
not at this late date. 
The "two issue rule" proposed by respondent is supposedly 
designed to simplify the work of trial courts and to limit 
the scope of the proceedings on review. Colonial Stores, Inc. 
v. Scarborough, 355 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1978). That certainly is 
a calous concept of the "substantial justice" of Rule 61, ~· 
Convenience of the trial and appellate courts should never 
be an impediment to a fair trial of the issues between parties 
litigant. 
The "two issue rule" places the burden on the appellant t! 
have prepared and submitted special interrogatories to the 
jury if the respondents can affirmatively demonstrate on appea. 
that there are at least two distinct dispositive issues one 
or more of which is error free and supported by substantial 
evidence. Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood Flooring~ 
-6-
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199 A.2d 698 (Conn. 1964); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarborough, 
supra. The opposing line of cases previously cited would place 
the burden of the special interrogatories on the respondents. 
Respondent in proposing the "two issue rule" to the court 
represents that the appellant in this case has waived his right to claim 
the errors asserted in his brief because he did not request that 
the trial court submit the issues upon special interrogatories. 
The appellant should not be penalized in this action for following 
the admonition of this Court not to submit special interrogatories 
to juries in negligence actions between two parties: 
A majority of the members of the court are of the 
opinion that in cases such as this ... it would 
be better practice to submit the case to the jury 
upon a general verdict. It appears that the 
best efforts of trial judges to make inter-
rogatories simple, concise and understandable still 
result in juries misunderstanding what was intended. 
Barton v. Jensen, 19 U.2d 196, 429 P.2d 44, 46 
(1967). 
The law of Barton, supra vitiates against the adoption 
of the respondent's proposed rule. There is structurally no 
way that a party, whether he be defendant or plaintiff, 
can ever know whether or not a given error which, on its 
face is prejudicial, was the determinative factor in the 
case. If the burden were placed on Conk to present special 
interrogatories in order to claim that such a patent error is 
predjudicial it would be a burden never recognized as such 
by this Honorable Court. Furthermore, it would be unfair. 
Let us carry this point out one step furhter. Conk is admonished 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by this Supreme Court not to confuse the jury with special 
interrogatories and then is told that because he didn't 
submit special interrogatories his appeal fails for not sustair .. 
the burden of showing that a patent critical error in the 
instructions was in fact prejudicial. Such a proposition 
is ludicrous. More importantly it is simply not the law of 
this State. 
Respondent claims at page 20 of his brief that he, "advan; 
three separate and distinct defenses at the time of trial: 
First, that the defendants were not negligent; second, that~ 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's rena: 
failure; and third, that the plaintiff's claims were barr~~ 
the statute of limitations." A medical malpractice action sue 
as this involves difficult scientific issues that are unavoida! 
enmeshed with the legal issues. This creates a situation wherr 
in the "two issue rule" simply cannot be applied. The 
"distinct determinative issue requirement" cannot be met. consL 
for example the matters that must be resolved in determining 
when the statute of limitations would begin to run as in the 
case at bar if, arguendo, the facts supported its submission 
to the jury which appellant continues to deny. 
1. At what point in time an injury, if any, occurred? 
2. At what point in time an injury, if any, occurred 
to a legally protected right? 
3. 
right? 
Who caused the invasion of the legally protected 
4. At what point in time the "injury" was or should 
have been discovered by the injured individual? 
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5. Whether or not certain acts of the offending 
individual would act to conceal the above from the injured party? 
6. Whether or not the offending individual fulfilled 
his duty to disclose relevant material information? 
7. What information was relevant and material? 
8. Whether the injured individual acted prudently during 
the course of his treatment and thereafter in making reasonable 
inquiry to discover the above? 
Each of the above issues contains some elements of 
proximate cause and negligence. The net effect is 
that if there is error in any one of the three major defenses 
asserted by defendant, it poisons the other issues and the 
entire proceeding. 
Where, as is alleged by appellant, there exists multiple 
errors in failing to grant a directed verdict on specific 
issues, coupled with failure to properly instruct the jury 
on those issues the error has even greater impact on the 
intertwined defenses. The fallacy of the contention that 
the issues are distinct and not interrelated is most apparent. 
In sununary, the "two issue rule" is not the law in Utah 
and has never been the law. Under the framework of Utah law 
and the better reasoned authority it should not be adopted. 
Even if it is adopted, it should not apply to the issues of 
this case as the submission of written interrogatories to 
perfect the record for appeal was specifically discouraged 
by this Court at all times prior to this particular appeal 
and appellant was adhering to that policy and should not now 
-9-
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be punished for said adherence to Court mandate. Even if 
the "two issue rule" is adopted by the Court it does not fit 
a medical malpractice case involving the issue of the statute 
of limitations because the issues once submitted to the jury 
are so intertwined that they are no longer "distinct issues" 
as contemplated by the "rule". 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED THE VERDICT FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF ON THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Only brief mention need be made on the issue of respondent 
failure to obtain informed consent from appellant. That issue 
has been fully covered in the brief of appellant. But respon-
dent's brief requires further comment. 
Respondent now wishes this Court to believe that the proce 
was not experimental. It appears that the procedure is 
"experimental" or "not experimental" at the "convenience" of 
the respondent. In proceedings in another case that predated 
the matter currently before the court the procedure was "exper· 
imental" and he did so inform the patient because it was impor~ 
to do so. (R. 787-788). Then at his deposition in the presen: 
matter the operation was "not experimental" and therefore he 
did not inform Mr. Conk of that fact. (R. 258 and R. 788-7891 
Then at the time of trial, knowing that he would be confrontei 
with previous testimony it became convenient for the procedure 
to be experimental again. (R. 787-788) Only at trial for 
· nfor 
the first time was it "inconvenient" for him not to have 1 
-10-
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( 
his patient that the operation was "experimental" so he 
. believe(s) .•. 'or' ... thinks ..• ", but he is not 
sure that he revealed that critical fact to his patient. (R. 788-
789). Now, on appeal respondent has chosen again to flip flop 
on his own admission and say that procedure was "not experimental" 
(Respondent's Brief at 22-23). That, certainly, is an incred-
ible performance that places the doctor's testimony clearly 
in the status of being so internally inconsistent as to refute 
itself and not worthy as a defense in light of appellant's 
unequivocal denial of being informed that the operation was 
experimental (R. 435-436). The trial court erred in not directing 
the jury's verdict on informed consent as moved by appellant 
(R. 1370-1372) Respondent's testimony cannot support a verdict 
in his favor on that issue. See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 25 U.2d 
76, 475 P.2d 1013 (1970); Alvardo v. Tucker, 2 U.2d 16, 268 
P.2d 986 (1954). 
Respondent further seems to imply that he did not owe a 
duty to inform this patient that the operation was experimental 
because the risk of the type of kidney damage suffered by the 
appellant was unknown to the profession at that time. (R~s­
pondent' s Brief Point II). In addition, respondent contends that 
because the risk of kidney damage was unknown at that time, 
no liability should attach because there was no failure to inform 
of a known risk. 
That is a circuitous argument of no merit when one considers 
-11-
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an "experimental" procedure. By its very definition, "experirr,,· 
means that the procedure is not merely new, but so new that 
all of the potential serious risks cannot be known. If a 
patient is to be a guinea pig he should be entitled to know 
that fact. If he is not so informed and he is caused physi~l 
or mental damage as a result of the experiment from any un-
known risk, he should prevail. The unknown risk is what 
makes the procedure experimental. The unknown risk is what 
caused the damage. (It should be kept in mind that appellant 
does not concede that the potential for kidney damage was ~ 
unknown risk. See Appellant's Brief Point II pages 37-58). 
An early Utah case not cited previously very aptly s~t~ 
the burden on a physician to give adequate information to his 
patient so that he can make intelligent decisions as to his 
own choice of medical care and treatment. In Everts v. Worrel: 
58 U 238, 197 P 1043 (1921), the defendant injected the plaint 
with serum designed to resolve an "acne" problem. Within 
a relatively short time the plaintiff was paralyzed from the 
waist down. Defendant alleged that he had given the plaintiff 
certain instructions that were not followed. The Court stated 
that the instructions were insufficient in that they ''. · · ~! 
merely perfunctory and in no way enlightening to plaintiff 
respecting his condition." (58 u at 249-250). The court went 
to state the law regarding what a physician should inform hl5 
patient: 
-12-
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It is incumbent on a physician to give 
such instructions as are proper and necessary 
to enable the patient or his nurses and atten-
dants to act intelligently in the further treat-
ment of the case, and failure to do so is negli-
gence which will render him liable for injury 
resulting therefrom. (58 Utah at 250) (emphasis added) 
A Federal Tort Claims Act case interpreting New Mexico law 
in which a Veterans Administration doctor administered massive 
radiation therapy for treatment of cancer in a patient with-
out informing him of the drastic and experimental nature of 
the procedure is enlightening on the legal obligation of a 
physician. 
. . • our legal system requires that the 
treatment to be administered must be within the 
bounds of recognized medical standards in order 
to overcome legal challenges such as that pre-
sented in this case. Accordingly, in order for 
a physician to avoid liability by engaging in 
drastic or experimental treatment which exceeds 
the bounds of established medical standards his 
patient must be fully informed of the experimental 
nature of the treatment and of the foreseeable 
consequences· of the treatment. (emphasis added) 
Ahern v. Veterans Administration, 537 F.2d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 
1976). See also, Gatson v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 350-351 
(Ariz. 1978). 
In this case, as a matter of law, the evidence leads to 
but one conclusion, the appellant was not given adequate 
information upon which to give an informed consent to the 
operation performed on him. 
The challenged Instruction Numbers 15 and 16 are prejudicial 
error as argued in Point II of Appellant's Brief at pages 54-58. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, respondent at pages 26 and 27 of his brief, again 
implies the circuitous argument that a physician cannot be 
held accountable for his failure to inform a patient that an 
operation is "experimental" because the risks are unknown. 
That cannot be left unchallenged, as the argument suggests 
the proper resolution for the doctor; simply to inform · 
the patient that the risks attendant to the procedure are 
not known. The respondent failed to make such a disclosure 
on an item of great significance to his patient and even 
under his own theory should be liable for the damages caused 
by his ommission to obtain his patient's informed consent. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE 
ISSUE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
TO THE JURY AND COMPOUNDED THAT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY SUBMITTING THE ISSUE 
UNDER IMPROPER INTRUCTIONS 
Respondent makes an attempt in his brief to mask his 
own failure to present any evidence to support his affirm~~ 
defense that the appellant's cause of action should be barred 
by the statute of limitations. (See Appellant's Brief pages: 
At Point IV of his brief, pages 37 to 41, he states that 
th 1 . . ' . t. nos. 24 and. . . e p aintiff s objections to instruc ion 
are raised for the first time on appeal and need not be consi:' 
That simply is not true. The trial court's attention was 
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directed to the issue of when the appellant discovered " . . • 
or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered 
the injury ... " [Section 78-12-28 (3) U.C.A.) in appellant's 
motion for directed verdict (R. 1370-1373), in his exceptions to 
the instructions (R. 1338-1339) and again in his motion for 
new trial and supporting brief (R. 225-227). At each such point 
in time the trial court was cited authority on the issue of 
when the cause of action would accrue so that the two year period 
of the statute would begin running. The cases cited by respondent 
stand for the proposition that the purpose of taking exceptions 
is to bring to the attention of the trial court errors so that 
they might in the interests of justice be corrected. Those 
errors were brought to the attention of the trial judge and he 
failed to remedy them on three different occasions prior to 
this appeal. 
At the time of trial, the case of Foil v. Ballinger, 
supra, had not yet been decided by this Court. Therein, as 
the Court will recall, is precise support for the position asserted 
by the appellant. As to those errors in instruction numbers 24 
and 25, respondent has by his silence conceded the point. The 
fact that the trial court could not be appraised of a decision 
not yet made by the Supreme Court does not in any manner diminish 
the damaging and prejudicial effect of those errors upon 
the rights of Conk at the trial. 
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Let us assume for the sake of argument only that there wa: 
a true issue of fact on the statute of limitations and that th, 
trial court was not advised in sufficient detail of its errors 
as asserted by respondent. This Court should still reverse tho 
judgment in this case and remand this matter to the trial coun 
the interest of justice. Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states in pertinent part: 
. . • No party may assign as error the giving 
or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of 
an instruction, a party must state distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
for his objection. Notwithstandin~ the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court, in its dis-
cretion and in the interests of justice, may 
review the giving or failure to give an in-
struction. (emphasis added) 
Most, if not all, courts have declared that they have the 
authority to relax the strict requirements of a rule of pro-
cedure in order to avoid surprise or a serious miscarriage of 
justice or to otherwise aid in fulfilling the purposes of t~b 
appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g. McCarrey v. Cornrnissione~ 
Resources, 526 P. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1974); Moore v. Burdman, 526 p,: 
893 (Wash. 1974). 
This Court has long stated that Rule 51, supra, must gove: 
procedure and " [is) to be followed unless some pers~sb 
reason to the contrary invokes the discretion of the court to 
extricate a person from a situation where some gross injustW 
d . k 2 u.: or inequity would otherwise result." McCall v. Hen ric:._, 
364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954). See also State v. Cobo, 60 p,2d 9 ~ 
(Utah 1936); State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 197 6) 
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wherein at 545 P.2d at 196 footnote 6, the Court stated, 
. this court may ... notice errors if it is convinced 
that an injustice has resulted •.. " 
Continuing with the assumption for argument's sake that 
no exceptions at all were made to the instructions at issue in 
this argument point, there could never be a clearer case of 
injustice than the one presented by this case. At 
the time of trial neither the trial court nor the parties had 
the benefit of this Court's decision in Foil, supra. It 
would be a gross miscarriage of justice to deny an appellant 
the right to raise such an acutely prejudicial misstate-
ment of the law as is contained in the trial court's instructions. 
If this situation does not fit the exception of Rule 51, no 
civil case could ever fit within its parameters. The exception 
would constitute an empty gesture of fairness and justice without 
substance. 
Nonetheless, this Court should never reach the necessity of 
making that decision in the case at bar. The issues were properly 
raised in the trial court. More important than that, however, 
is the basic merit to the proposition that the issue of the 
statute of limitations should never have been presented to the 
jury. On any "discovery" theory, the record is devoid of affirm-
ative facts to support the defense. (See Appellant's Brief 
pp. 30-37). 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent in his statement of facts has chosen to go well 
beyond any reasonable inference that the facts of this case wi 
support. Therefore, appellant will stand by his statement of 
the relevant facts as stated in various parts of his briefs. 
Respondent has conceded that the instructions on the stat 
of limitations given to the jury by the trial court are in err 
However, respondent claims that the exceptions taken by appell 
were not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The tri 
was fully appraised of the problem areas of its instructions 
at the time of the motion for directed verdict, the exceptions 
to the instructions, and at the motion for new trial. Even 
if no exceptions at all were taken the Foil decision comi~~ 
the case at bar was already on appeal would dictate a reversal 
Otherwise, a grave injustice would result which would fit 
directly into the exception stated in Rule 51 of the Utah Rul1 
of Civil Procedure. 
Whether the exceptions taken at the time of trial were 
sufficient is moot in any event. The evidence and all reason 
able inferences taken therefrom dictate that appellant's rnoti 
for a directed verdict on both the issue of the statute 
of limitations and informed consent should have been granted. 
Any instructions given to the jury on those is sues would be 
prejudicial error. Only the issues of causation and damages 
should have gone to the jury. 
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Respondent has advanced to this court that it should 
adopt the "two issue rule." That "rule" has never been the 
rule in Utah. Its basic tenets are contrary to the framework 
of past Utah law including, but not limited to the definitions 
of prejudicial error, and the policy not to look behind the 
jury's decision to determine whether the verdict is based 
upon a proper instruction or upon an instruction with 
prejudicial error contained in it. The "two issue rule" is 
further contrary to the better reasoned authority and is not 
the majority rule. 
Additionally, if the court were to adopt the "two issue 
rule" and apply it to this case, it would punish this 
appellant for following the Court's prior admonition not to 
confuse juries with special interrogatories. Such a retro-
active application of the "rule" should not be made. 
Further, when the trial court chose to submit the issue 
of the statute of limitations in this case, the other issues 
became so interrelated with it that they were no longer 
distinct determinative issues as is required in the "two 
issue rule." The case at bar would not fit into that category 
of cases that could be resolved by the "two issue rule." 
This is especially true when the multiple errors committed 
in this case are viewed as they relate to one another and 
the other issues. 
Appellant refers the court to his conclusion in his 
brief in chief as an outline of wherein error has been committed 
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in the areas discussed in this Reply Brief as well as the other 
of error from which relief is requested. It is respectfully 
submitted to this Court that this appeal is meritorious on 
all points raised by the appellant. The judgment should~ 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 1980. 
BLACK & MOORE 
ES R. BLACK 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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